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NOV 2 1 2014 
IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON 01 NTY 
STATE OF GEORGIA 
HOMELAND SELF STORAGE 
'MANAGEMENT, LLC, et al.; 
OEPUTY CLERKSUPERIOR COURT 
FULTON COUNTY, GA 
.. Plaintiffs, 
v. Civil Action File No. 
2014-CV-246999 
PINE MOUNTAIN CAPITAL 
PARTNERS, LLC; HOMELAND 
SPORTS CARD COLLECTOR, LLC; 
and KEVIN J. IRLBECK, in his 
fiduciary and individual capacities, COpy 
ORDER 
Before the Court are (1) Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs First Amended 
Verified Complaint, I or Alternatively, for a More Definite Statement, (2) Defendants' Motion for 
Protective Order, and (3) Plaintiffs Motion to Lift Automatic Stay of Discovery. Upon 
consideration of the motions and the briefs submitted the Court finds as follows: 
I. ALLEGED FACTS 
This case involves the alleged malfeasance of Defendant Kevin J. Irlbeck, the former 
CFO of Plaintiff Homeland Storage Management LLC ("Homeland Storage"). The other named 
Plaintiffs2 (the "Partnerships") are holding partnerships that own the assets, including the 
1 Homeland has since filed a Second Amended Complaint adding various plaintiff partnerships 
that owned properties managed by Homeland Self Storage Management, LCe. The Court 
considers the facts as laid out in the Second Amended Complaint. 
2 Plaintiffs Broward Real Estate Investments - Kennesaw LLLP; Broward Real Estate 
Investments - Peachtree Crest LLLP; BREI Breckenridge LLLP; Broward Real Estate 
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underlying real estate, of metropolitan Atlanta self-storage facilities (the "Self-Storage 
Locations"). Homeland Storage manages the day-to-day operation and finances of the Self- 
Storage Locations and acts as a common paymaster for the Self-Storage Locations and 
Partnerships. 
Homeland Storage hired Irlbeck as its Chief Financial Officer ("CFO") in 2005 or 2006. 
Before working as Homeland's CFO, Irlbeck worked for Bruce Weiner ("Weiner") for several 
years on certain accounting, taxation, and other financial projects. Weiner is Homeland 
Storage's co-owner and CEO and also a partner in the Partnerships. As CFO, Irlbeck was 
responsible for the finances, vendor payments, accounting needs, and tax planning of Homeland 
Storage, the Self-Storage Locations, and the Partnerships. His duties also included project 
management oversight, document review, and contract negotiations. On or about July 8, 2011, 
Irlbeck emailed Weiner his letter of resignation. 
After Irlbeck's resignation, while trying to refinance major lines of credit for the 
Partnerships, Weiner discovered that Irlbeck had failed to pay property taxes and outstanding 
construction vendor invoices, despite Irlbeck's assurances to Weiner that Plaintiffs were CUlTent 
on both. As a result, the Partnerships incurred significant tax liability and assessed penalties, the 
Partnerships' lenders declined the refmancing of a multimillion-dollar line of credit, and Weiner 
was forced to sell off some Self Storage Locations at a loss. 
Plaintiffs also allege that Irlbeck redirected payments from Homeland Storage to a 
similarly named entity controlled by Irlbeck called Homeland Sports Card Collector, LLC 
Investments - Sandy Plains LLLP; BREI Stephens Center LP; BREI Cobb Parkway LLLP; 
BREI Ronald Regan LLLP; BREI Monument Road LLLP; BREI Girvin Road LLLP; BREI 
Beach Blvd LLLP; and BREI Mansfield Holdings LLLP 
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("Homeland Sports"), Weiner alleges that Irlbeck directed him to sign Homeland Storage checks 
made out simply to "Homeland" with the memo line "transfer." Irlbeck told Weiner that they 
needed to transfer funds between Homeland Storage's accounts for accounting purposes, but 
Plaintiffs assert that the checks were made out in this manner so that they could be redirected to 
Homeland SpOlis's bank accounts. Plaintiffs also allege that Irlbeck forged Weiner's signature 
on similar checks from Homeland Storage with a "transfer" notation. The Complaint does not 
allege when these checks were made or deposited, how often, or for how much. 
Finally, Plaintiffs allege that some Homeland Storage construction invoices have been 
paid from bank accounts related to an entity controlled by Irlbeck called Pine Mountain Capital 
Partners, LLC ("Pine Mountain");' While the Complaint does not specify how, the Complaint 
alleges that funds were redirected from Homeland Storage to Pine Mountain as well. 
Plaintiffs assert two claims against the Defendants, Breach of Fiduciary Duty and Fraud. 
Plaintiffs claim they were damaged through monetary loss, incurring liabilities and penalties, the 
denial of loan refinancing, and being forced to sell off properties at a loss. 
II. LAW AND ANALYSIS 
Defendants move to dismiss the First Amended Complaint arguing it fails to state a 
viable claim for both breach of fiduciary duty and fraud. It is well established that, "[ a] 
complaint should be dismissed for failure to state a claim only if the allegations, when viewed in 
the light most favorable to the plaintiff, 'disclose with certainty that no set of facts consistent 
with the allegations could be proved that would entitle the plaintiff the relief he seeks. '" 
3 Weiner has an unrelated non-party entity named Alpharetta Capital Partners, LLC. 
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Synovous Bank v. Griner, 321 Ga. App. 359,360 (20 13)(quoting Benedict v. State Farm Bank, 
309 Ga. App. 133, l34 (2011». 
a. Breach of Fiduciary Duty against Irlbeck 
The Second Amended Complaint sufficiently alleges a claim for breach of fiduciary duty 
against Irlbeck. "A claim for a breach of fiduciary duty requires proof of three elements: (1) the 
existence of a fiduciary duty; (2) breach of that duty; and (3) damage proximately caused by the 
breach." Bienert v. Dickerson, 276 Ga. App. 621, 623 (2005)(quoting Griffin v. Fowler, 260 Ga. 
App. 443,445(1) (2003)). 
Defendants first argue there is no specific allegation of wrongdoing to support a breach 
because Irlbeck's judgment as a corporate officer performing his duties is protected under the 
business judgment rule and the allegations merely question Irlbeck's job performance. See Fed. 
Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Loudermilk, 761 Ga. 332,338 (2014). However, the business judgment 
rule does not protect corporate officers from decisions that are made in bad faith or that do not 
comport with the officer's duty of care and loyalty. Id. Plaintiffs allege Irlbeck, as CFO and a 
CP A, failed to competently perform his accounting duties, failed to pay taxes and vendors, 
forged checks, and redirected funds from Homeland Storage to entities he controlled. A breach 
of fiduciary duty claim has been sufficiently alleged because evidence presented supporting these 
allegations could show Irlbeck acted in bad faith or in violation of his duties of care and loyalty. 
Second, Defendants argue that harm is not alleged to a party plaintiff, because Weiner, a 
non-party, sold off the Self-Storage Locations at a loss, not Homeland Storage. However, the 
Second Amended Complaint adds the Partnerships as party plaintiffs and states the Partnerships 
owned and sold the Self-Storage Locations, clarifying the link between Plaintiffs and the sale of 
the Self-Storage Locations, and therefore this argument is moot. 
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Third, Defendants argue that Irlbeck's alleged failure to make payments on debts does 
not show any actual harm to the Plaintiffs because they fail to allege the ability to pay if Irlbeck 
discharged his duties properly. However, whether Plaintiffs would have had the financial means 
to pay the construction invoices and property taxes had they known they were past due, is a fact 
issue and should not be considered in the context of a motion to dismiss. Further, Plaintiffs have 
alleged other injuries arising from Irlbeck's breach of fiduciary duty, including significant tax 
liabilities, penalties, redirected funds, loss of borrowing ability, and loss on property sales due to 
Irlbeck's actions, which is sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. As 
such, Defendants motion to dismiss the breach of fiduciary claim is DENIED. 
b. Fraud Against Irlbeck 
Plaintiffs' allegation of fraud and deceit against Irlbeck is also sufficiently pled to avoid 
dismissal at this early stage. "To assert a claim for fraud in Georgia, a plaintiff must show (i) a 
false representation or omission of a material fact; (ii) scienter; (iii) intention to induce the party 
claiming fraud to act or refrain from acting; (iv) justifiable reliance; and (v) damages." 
TechBios, Inc. v. Champagne, 301 Ga. App. 592,594 (2009). Defendants assert that Plaintiffs 
have failed to plead justifiable reliance and resulting damages. Specifically, Defendants again 
suggest that Homeland would have been delinquent on tax and vendor payments even if Irlbeck 
had not represented that Homeland was current and that the Partnerships' inability to refinance is 
too tenuously related to any misrepresentations by Irlbeck. As noted above, however, the Court 
should not judge the credibility of Plaintiffs' alleged damages when deciding a motion to 
dismiss. Plaintiffs have sufficiently pled these and other misrepresentations by Irlbeck, such as 
those related to diverting Homeland Storage "transfer" funds to Irlbeck's accounts. As such, 
Defendants' motion to dismiss this count is DENIED. 
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Alternatively, Plaintiffs ask for a more definite statement on this claim to conform with 
the heighted fraud pleading requirements of O.C.G.A. § 9-11-9(b). It has long been the law of 
Georgia that, "a general allegation of fraud amounts to nothing-it is necessary that the 
complainant show, by specification, wherein the fraud consists. Issuable facts must be charged." 
Fairfax v. Wells Fargo Bank, NA., 312 Ga. App. 171, 172 (2001). The purpose of the 
heightened pleading standard requirement "is to insure a defendant has sufficient notice to enable 
him to prepare a responsive pleading." Hayes v. Hallmark Apartments, Inc., 232 Ga. 307,309 
(1974). The Court of Appeals has upheld dismissal of counts for fraud and breach of fiduciary 
duties against corporate directors when the allegations were conclusory and not certain See 
Continental Jnv. Corp. v. Cherry, 124 Ga. App. 863, 866 (1971). In Continental, a corporation 
made conclusory allegations that its own directors were involved in a fraudulent course of self- 
dealing over a seven year period during which time they sold properties they owned to the 
corporation for inflated prices and sold other property owned by the corporation at deflated 
prices for their own gain. Jd. at 864. The trial court gave Plaintiff an opportunity to plead with 
more specificity to make the fraud allegations more certain, but it failed to do so, and the trial 
court dismissed the case. Jd. at 866. The Court of Appeals affirmed, noting that, "no facts were 
stated relating to any specific transactions of the defendants by time, place, amount, or other 
identification, the mere conclusory allegations that the defendants did defraud the corporation by 
a course of dealing in which unspecified property was purchased too dearly or sold too cheaply, 
without indicating what transactions were referred to, do not meet statutory standards, and the 
complaint was properly dismissed on motion." Jd. 
Here, the Complaint alleges Irlbeck had Weiner sign checks and forged other checks 
made out to "Homeland" for "transfer" between accounts, but there is no allegation as to when 
6 
these checks were written, in what amount, or how many checks were fraudulently issued. 
Plaintiffs have issued subpoenas to certain banks for complete banking records for all of 
Irlbeck's accounts from 2007 to 2011, but presumably, Homeland Storage has access to its own 
checks that were written from its own accounts. Plaintiffs, in response, claim they cannot 
confirm where the checks were deposited because, although the checks were negotiated, they do 
not have endorsement stamps or signatures. Further, at oral argument on an unrelated motion, 
Plaintiffs' Counsel indicated that Plaintiffs' recordkeeping was "in complete and utter disarray" 
when Irlbeck left as CFO, and that it would be very difficult for Homeland to track deposits 
made into its own accounts because any "transfer" check may be deposited along with multiple 
other checks, and the banking records would only reflect the total amount deposited at any time. 
Even if some of these checks were not endorsed, as Plaintiffs argue in their response to 
the Motion, Plaintiffs could presumably cross-reference its own accounts for deposits that match 
the withdrawals and determine which checks were misappropriated instead of transferred or if 
any funds were inexplicably missing. While dissecting cumulative deposits into Homeland's own 
accounts may be difficult, there is no reason to think that it would be any more or less difficult 
than reviewing Defendants' banking account deposit records. Further, there were allegedly 
representations made to law enforcement that 227 forgeries occurred between 2009 and 2011 for 
a total loss of $1,742,545.27. It is unclear to the Court why Plaintiffs have not alleged a single 
one of these transfers as fraudulent in their Complaint, but Plaintiffs seem to contend that they 
need Defendants banking records to determine the specific instances of fraudulent transfer. 
Additionally, Plaintiffs also assert that Irlbeck "repeatedly represented" to Homeland 
Storage that all property tax and vendor payments that were due were paid even though they 
were not paid in 2010. They allege that Irlbeck assured Weiner "on an annual basis" that 
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property taxes had been paid on behalf of Homeland Storage and the Partnerships and that 
Irlbeck's assurances that vendors had been paid were "routine and relatively frequent." Plaintiffs 
do not provide any information about the unpaid construction vendor invoices. 
Ruling on Defendants' Motion for a More Definite Statement is hereby DEFERRED 
until hearing on the issue of discovery of Defendants' banking records as discussed further 
below. 
c. Pine Mountain and Homeland Sports Card Collectors as Alleged Conspirators 
Defendants next argue that Pine Mountain and Homeland Sports should be dismissed 
from the case because there is no wrongdoing alleged against the LCes and neither company can 
conspire with their sole agent, Irlbeck. "[A] person who maliciously procures an injury to be 
done to another, whether an actionable wrong or a breach of contract, is a joint wrongdoer and 
may be subject to an action either alone or jointly with the person who actually committed the 
injury." O.C.G.A. § 51-12-30. Therefore, "one who procures or assists in the commission of an 
actionable wrong is equally liable with the actual perpetrator for the damages." White v. 
Shamrock Bldg. Systems, Inc., 294 Ga. App. 340, 348 (2008) (quoting City of Hawkinsville v. 
Wilson & Wilson, Inc., 231 Ga. 110, 111 (1973). 
Here, Irlbeck created two entities, Pine Mountain and Homeland Sports, with names 
similar to those entities owned by Weiner. Homeland Storage vendors were allegedly paid 
through the bank account of Pine Mountain, an unrelated company. Plaintiffs assert that funds 
were diverted from Homeland Storage to Irlbeck's entities, Pine Mountain and Homeland Sports. 
Evidence supporting the allegations that, through the use of their bank accounts, the LLCs 
assisted Irlbeck's in his actions could show that Pine Mountain and Homeland Sports are liable 
as joint wrongdoers. 
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Defendants also argue that the sole owner of a corporation cannot conspire with the 
corporation and therefore Irlbeck, as sole agent, cannot conspire with Pine Mountain and 
Homeland Sports, citing Nalley Northside Chevrolet, Inc. v. Herring, 215 Ga. App. 185, 187-88 
(1994). However, the intra-corporate conspiracy doctrine that Defendants rely on recognizes the 
possibility that employees or agents of a corporation can conspire with the corporation if they are 
acting outside of their scope of employment. See Nalley Northside Chevrolet, Inc., 215 Ga. App. 
at 187-88 ("here no allegation was made that [the employee] acted outside the scope of his 
employment"); See also White, 294 Ga. App. at 347 (the federal intra-corporate conspiracy 
doctrine prevents conspiracy between corporation and employee, when employees are acting 
within the scope of employment) (citing McAndrew v. Lockhead Martin Corp., 206 F.3d. 1031 
(11 th Cir. 2000). 
Further, it is not clear that the Nalley Northside Chevrolet case controls here. The 
Georgia Court of Appeals recognized in White v. Shamrock Bldg. Systems, Inc. that under 
Georgia law a corporation is a distinct legal person and separate from its agents. White, 294 Ga. 
App. at 348-49. Therefore, the Court of Appeals found that a corporation could be liable for 
conspiring with its sole shareholder to breach a fiduciary duty. Id. 
No matter the case law that is applicable to this case, dismissal is inappropriate. 
Evidence supporting the allegations that Pine Mountain and Homeland Sports bank accounts 
were used to divert funds away from Homeland Storage could support a finding that Irlbeck was 
acting outside his scope of employment with regard to those entities. That finding is unnecessary 
if White controls. Irlbeck and the entities would be distinct legal persons and evidence could be 
presented to prove the assistance as alleged in the Complaint and determine Pine Mountain and 
Homeland Sports were joint wrongdoers as to both breach of fiduciary duty and fraud. 
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As such, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the LLC entities is hereby DENIED. 
III. Plaintiffs Motion to Lift Automatic Stay of Discovery 
Because the Court has denied Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, the automatic stay of 
discovery under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-12(j)(1) is now lifted. Therefore, Plaintiffs Motion to Lift 
Automatic Stay of Discovery is MOOT. 
IV. Defendants' Motion for Protective Order 
Defendants move the COUlt to issue a protective order to ensure the discovery stay is 
maintained until the motion to dismiss has been decided. As the Motion to Dismiss has been 
decided, this motion is also MOOT. 
Defendants also move the Court to issue a protective order preventing Wells Fargo Bank, 
N.A. and the Private Bank of Buckhead from producing any documents in response to the 
Plaintiffs' subpoenas until such time as the Court indicates or enter a protective order limiting 
access to confidential information and limiting how sensitive financial information may be used. 
Under O.CG.A. § 9-11-26 (c), the COUlt may issue a protective order in its discretion to "protect 
a patty or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense," 
upon a showing of good cause. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-26 (c); McKesson HBOe, Inc. v. Adler, 253 
Ga. App. 500, 505 (2002). In particular, the discovery of a defendant's financial circumstances 
is not unlimited and the competing interest in an individual's right to privacy must be 
accommodated in the discovery process. Ledee v. Devoe, 225 Ga. App. 620, 625 (1997); 
Borenstein v. Blumenfeld, 151 Ga. App. 420, 421 (1979). The court should consider the ability 
of the requesting party to obtain financial information by other means. See Sechler Family 
Partnership v. Prime Group, Inc., 255 Ga. App. 854,859 (2002) (allowing discovery of non- 
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privileged, relevant financial information from third parties where there was no evidence that 
information could be obtained by other means or was meant to embarrass or harass); but see 
Mitzner v. Hyman, 175 Ga. App. 311, 311-13 (1985) (not allowing discovery of financial records 
that might disclose transaction involving allegedly stolen merchandise as request was calculated 
to burden rather than to lead to admissible evidence). 
As discussed above, the Court is unclear why Plaintiffs must resort to four years' worth 
of Defendants' banking records to identify the fraudulent transfers alleged. So far, no missing 
money or forged checks have been identified. Plaintiffs have failed to provide a sufficient 
explanation why they cannot identify allegedly fraudulent transfers by less obtrusive means, such 
as consulting its own banking records. The identification of the checks and missing money could 
lead to more targeted discovery to the non-patty banks that would less drastically infringe on the 
privacy rights of the Defendants and third parties. 
As such, this Court will hold a hearing on December 2,2014 at 9:30 a.m. to allow the 
parties to further explain why Plaintiffs cannot obtain the circumstances of the alleged fraudulent 
by consulting Homeland Storage's own banking records. The subpoenas directed to the Wells 
Fargo Bank, N.A. and the Private Bank of Buckhead are hereby held in abeyance and Wells 
Fargo Bank, N.A. and the Private Bank of Buckhead are hereby ordered not to produce the 
requested financial information until further Order of this COUlt. 
SO ORDERED this;)/ day of November, 2014. 
Jud 
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Copies to: 
Robert J. Kaufman 
KAUFMAN, MILLER & FORMAN, P.C. 
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Atlanta, GA 30350 
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Attorney for Defendants 
John Da Grosa Smith 
Matthew A. Horvath 
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